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CONSPIRACY AND THE FANTASY DEFENSE: 
THE STRANGE CASE OF THE CANNIBAL COP 
KAITLIN EK† 
ABSTRACT 
  In the notorious “Cannibal Cop” case, New York police officer 
Gilberto Valle was accused of conspiring to kidnap, kill, and eat 
various women of his acquaintance. Valle claimed a “fantasy 
defense,” arguing that his expression represented not conspiracy 
agreement, but fantasy role-play. His conviction and subsequent 
acquittal raised questions about the freedom of speech, thoughtcrime, 
and the nature of conspiracy law. Because the essence of conspiracy is 
agreement, it falls into the category of crimes in which pure speech is 
the actus reus of the offense. This Note argues that as a result, 
conspiracy cases in which the fantasy defense is implicated pose 
special due-process and First Amendment dangers, and concludes 
that these dangers can be mitigated by a strengthened overt-act 
requirement. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Gil Valle’s fantasy is about seeing women executed. The fantasies 
that he is engaging in are about seeing women sexually assaulted, 
executed and left for dead. That’s not a fantasy that is OK.”  
– Randall W. Jackson, Assistant United States Attorney, in closing 
argument.1 
The headlines sound like something out of a schlocky slasher 
flick: “‘Cannibal’ Cop Plotted to Eat 100 Women: Feds,”2 “NYPD 
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 1. Transcript of Record at 1581, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 
2013).  
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Stew as Cannibal Cop Plots To Cook and Eat Women,”3 “‘Cannibal 
Cop’ Planned To Cook ‘Girl-Meat’ for Thanksgiving.”4 In late 2012, 
federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York charged the 
so-called “Cannibal Cop,” twenty-eight-year-old New York police 
officer Gilberto Valle, with conspiracy to commit kidnapping.5 He 
was arrested after his wife discovered an extensive log of emails and 
chats in which Valle discussed in graphic detail his desire to kidnap, 
rape, kill, and eat a number of women, including his wife, friends and 
acquaintances.6 
But although the emails and chats were real, Valle argued that 
the alleged conspiracy was not—rather, he contended that he was 
merely engaging in fantasy role-play, with no intention of carrying out 
the gruesome deeds he discussed online.7 He was a member of Dark 
Fetish Net, a social-networking website where users with unusual 
sexual predilections tell stories, role-play, and discuss sexual fantasies 
considered unacceptable in mainstream culture.8 He argued at trial, as 
he wrote in his online profile, “I like to press the envelope, but no 
matter what I say, it is all fantasy.”9 
But although prosecutors conceded that Valle was heavily 
involved in fantasy role-play, they maintained that some of the chats 
had moved beyond the realm of fantasy to become actual preparation 
 
 2. Richard Esposito, ‘Cannibal’ Cop Plotted To Eat 100 Women: Feds, ABC NEWS (Oct. 
25, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/cannibal-cop-plotted-eat-100-women-feds/story?id=
17562584. 
 3. Josh Margolin, NYPD Stew as Cannibal Cop Plots To Cook and Eat Women: Feds, 
N.Y. POST, Oct. 26, 2012, at 8, available at http://nypost.com/2012/10/26/nypd-stew-as-cannibal-
cop-plots-to-cook-and-eat-women-feds.  
 4. Jen Chung, “Cannibal Cop” Planned To Cook “Girl Meat” for Thanksgiving, 
GOTHAMIST (Nov. 21, 2012, 8:02 AM), http://gothamist.com/2012/11/21/cannibal_cop_planned_
to_cook_girl_m.php.  
 5. Complaint at 1, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2012), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/10/25/nyregion/Valle-Gilberto-Criminal-
Complaint.html. 
 6. Transcript of Record at 422, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 
2013).  
 7. See Transcript of Record at 130, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
25, 2013). 
 8. Transcript of Record at 1547–48, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 7, 2013). 
 9. Transcript of Record at 1409, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 
2013). 
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and agreement to gratify aberrant desires.10 The prosecution 
dismissed Valle’s fantasy defense, branding as ridiculous “this idea 
that you should somehow not be disturbed by the fact that this man, a 
police officer, walking around New York City every single day with a 
loaded weapon has a . . . primary sexual fantasy of seeing women 
mutilated and harmed in horrific ways.”11 
After twelve days of trial, the jury found Gilberto Valle guilty.12 
However, in a “stunning reversal”13 in June 2014, Judge Paul G. 
Gardephe granted the defense’s motion for acquittal on the 
conspiracy charge, and Gilberto Valle walked free after more than a 
year of incarceration.14 
Valle’s case garnered widespread media coverage, most of it 
focused on the grim details of the chats, emails, images, and videos 
found on Valle’s computer.15 The case even inspired an episode of 
Law and Order: Special Victims Unit.16 However, a small but vocal 
minority of commentators criticized the jury verdict as a thoughtcrime 
conviction that punished Valle for his fantasies rather than his acts.17 
As one columnist argued, “It’s time to defend the ‘cannibal cop’: He’s 
a weirdo, not a monster, and the U.S. attorney’s office means to roast 
him on the spit of prudery and overcaution. Gilberto Valle’s fantasies 
 
 10. See Transcript of Record at 1586, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 7, 2013) (“The reason is, he realizes that what he is doing is part of a plan that goes far 
beyond fantasy.”). 
 11. Id. at 1578.  
 12. See Transcript of Record at 1695, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 12, 2013). 
 13. Daniel Beekman & Dareh Gregorian, ‘Cannibal Cop’ Released into Custody of His 
Mother After Conviction Overturned in Stunning Reversal, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 1, 2014, 7:03 
AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/conviction-cannibal-nypd-overturned-
article-1.1850334#ixzz3BswPYruK. 
 14. Benjamin Weiser, Ruling in Cannibal Case Revives Debate over When a Fantasy 
Crosses a Criminal Line, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2014, at A20, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/nyregion/officer-gilberto-valle-freed-after-conviction-overturned-
in-cannibal-case.html. 
 15. See, e.g., Margolin, supra note 3. 
 16. Law and Order: Special Victims Unit: Thought Criminal (NBC television broadcast 
May 14, 2014). For a comparison of the episode and Valle’s case, see Allison Leotta, SVU’s 
“Thought Criminal”, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2014, 5:47 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/allison-leotta/svus-thought-criminal_b_5327940.html. 
 17. See, e.g., Fantasy Is Not a Crime, FREE GIL VALLE.NET, http://freegilvalle.net (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2015); Daniel Jennings, Can the Government Use Your Thoughts Against You?, 
OFF THE GRID NEWS (June 17, 2013), http://www.offthegridnews.com/2013/06/17/can-
government-use-your-thoughts-against-you. 
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are sick. His real-life prosecution may be even sicker.”18 Valle’s 
conviction and subsequent acquittal engendered a spirited debate 
encompassing fantasy, the First Amendment, sex, public safety, and 
the role of the judge and jury in negotiating the boundary lines 
between them.19 
This Note examines how the freedom to have and express 
fantasies interacts with the law of criminal conspiracy in cases like 
Valle’s. Although Valle’s case was perhaps singularly gruesome, it is 
one of a growing swell of cases in which criminal defendants claim a 
“fantasy defense.”20 Using Valle’s trial as an exemplar of the fantasy 
defense in practice, this Note argues that conspiracy law, as it stands 
today, is too formless and flexible to adequately safeguard against the 
risk that a jury will convict a defendant for expressing his fantasies 
rather than acting on them. This Note proposes that, contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Shabani,21 not only does 
the Constitution require that conspiracy include an overt-act element; 
it requires a more rigorous overt-act element than the version 
currently accepted in statutory or common law. 
Part I describes the Gilberto Valle case and other fantasy-
defense cases. Part II sketches the contours of the right to express 
fantasies under the First Amendment. Part III examines the 
implications of the actus reus requirement of criminal law for the 
fantasy defense. Part IV explores the theoretical underpinnings of 
conspiracy law, and explains how current conspiracy law allows for 
guilty verdicts on the basis of both improper reasoning and 
insufficient evidence. Finally, Part V proposes that conspiracy’s overt-
act requirement should be strengthened to avoid wrongful convictions 
and infringement on the right to expression. 
 
 18. Daniel Engber, Free the Cannibal Cop, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2013, 2:40 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2013/02/cannibal_cop_trial_gilberto_valle
_faces_life_in_prison_for_his_violent_fantasies.html. 
 19. See, e.g., Tracy Clark-Flory, The “Cannibal Cop” Debate, SALON (Mar. 12, 2013, 8:00 
PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/03/13/the_cannibal_cop_debate; Weiser, supra note 14; 
Walking the Line Between Off-Putting and Illegal, Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/03/05/in-free-speech-a-line-between-offputting-
and-illegal.  
 20. See infra Part I.C. 
 21. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994). 
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I.  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. GILBERTO VALLE 
The United States charged Gilberto Valle with conspiracy to 
commit kidnapping22 under 18 U.S.C. § 1201.23 For the jury to find 
Valle guilty, the government was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Valle intentionally entered into an agreement 
to commit kidnapping, that he intended that the kidnapping actually 
occur, and that he or one of his co-conspirators committed an overt 
act in furtherance of the conspiracy.24 The use of an instrumentality of 
interstate commerce—the Internet—supplied the nexus required for 
federal prosecution.25 This Section describes the progression of the 
trial and Valle’s subsequent acquittal. It also briefly summarizes 
several other cases illustrating some circumstances in which 
defendants may raise fantasy defenses. 
A. The Prosecution’s Case 
1. Valle’s Online Communications.  The first prong of the 
prosecution’s case was evidence about the content and nature of 
Valle’s online chats with other users of Dark Fetish Net.26 Specifically, 
the government alleged that Valle’s co-conspirators included a New 
Jersey man named Michael Van Hise, a Pakistani man named Ali 
 
 22. The government also charged Valle with unauthorized access of a police database 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B) (2012). Complaint, supra note 5, at 1. This Note will not discuss 
that charge except to the extent that the government offered Valle’s access of the police 
database as evidence of conspiracy. 
 23. Valle was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c), which provides: “If two or more persons 
conspire to violate this section and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the 
object of the conspiracy, each shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for 
life.” 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2012). The government specifically alleged that Valle conspired to 
violate 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), which reads: 
Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries 
away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person . . . [when] the offender 
travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any means, facility, or 
instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of 
the commission of the offense. 
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2012). 
 24. Transcript of Record at 1651, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 
2013). 
 25. Id. at 1654. 
 26. See Transcript of Record at 121, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
25, 2013) (outlining the prosecution’s evidence to be offered). 
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Khan, and a user known as Moody Blues27 (discovered during trial to 
be an English nurse named Dale Bollinger).28 
The prosecution introduced the chats through the testimony of 
FBI agent Corey Walsh.29 Walsh testified that of the thousands of 
chats and emails recovered from Valle’s computer, the FBI concluded 
that about forty represented actual conspiracy discussions, and that 
the remainder were mere fantasy.30 Walsh concluded that a chat was 
part of a mere fantasy when the participants used the word “fantasy” 
and that a chat was part of a real conspiracy when participants did not 
use the word “fantasy” and “the two people were sharing real details 
of women, names, what appeared to be photographs of the women, 
details of past crimes and [saying] that they were for real.”31 
The prosecution asked Agent Walsh to read aloud from the 
transcripts of the chats that he determined were real.32 The plans were 
violent and detailed—in the excerpts read in court, Valle painted 
himself as an aspiring professional kidnapper, willing to negotiate 
prices for contract deals, or to collaborate on plans to rape, kill, and 
eat targets.33 He outlined how he would kidnap the women,34 shared 
photographs of potential targets,35 and engaged in seemingly endless 
back-and-forth about cooking techniques.36 In a typical exchange, 
Valle, using the handle Mhal52, discussed his plan for cooking his 
friend Andria with Ali Khan: 
Mhal52: “Yeah, I really want her to be alive in the oven. I want her 
to experience being cooked alive.” 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Robert Gearty, Ginger Adams Otis & Dareh Gregorian, ‘Moody Blues,’ Alleged 
Twisted Online Chat Buddy of Accused ‘Cannibal Cop’ Gilberto Valle, Arrested in U.K. on Child 
Porn Rap, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 28, 2013, 11:46 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/
cannibal-buddy-moody-blues-booked-u-child-porn-charges-article-1.1276679#ixzz2ptrMxS8i. 
 29. Transcript of Record at 426, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 
2013). 
 30. Transcript of Record at 650–51, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
27, 2013). 
 31. Transcript of Record at 425, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 
2013). 
 32. Id. at 432–33.  
 33. Id. at 425. 
 34. Id. at 441. 
 35. Id. at 443. 
 36. Transcript of Record at 635, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 
2013). 
EK IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2015  8:11 PM 
2015] CONSPIRACY AND FANTASY 907 
Alisherkhan: “Tie her in a hogtied position and put her in oven. She 
will be a cool meat.” 
Mhal52: “No. She’ll be trussed up like a turkey laying on her back, 
her hands tied in front of her, her feet crossed at the ankles and tied 
up, then the hands and feet connected, tied with cooking twine.”37 
The defense acknowledged the horrific nature of the 
communications, but argued that the forty chats Walsh read from at 
trial were as fantastical as the thousands the FBI dismissed as role-
play.38 On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Walsh’s 
methodology for distinguishing between the real and fantasy chats, 
pointing out that the mere fact that a chat does not explicitly identify 
itself as fantasy does not mean that it is part of a real conspiracy 
plot.39 The defense argued that many elements of the “real” chats 
were also present in the fantasy chats, such as negotiating a price for 
kidnapping a victim or discussing the use of chloroform.40 
Additionally, the defense pointed to Valle’s user profile on Dark 
Fetish Net, on which he wrote, “I like to press the envelope, but no 
matter what I say, it is all fantasy.”41 
Furthermore, the defense contended that though the “real” chats 
contained references to actual women, Valle often falsified their last 
names and parts of their biographical information, as well as his own 
identity.42 And although the plots were meticulous in their detail, they 
were also patently preposterous. For instance, in one chat the FBI 
considered “real,” Valle said he would kidnap a woman; take her in 
his van to his mountain cabin; torture her using a pulley apparatus in 
his soundproofed basement; and, finally, cook her in his giant, 
human-sized oven.43 However, Valle had no van, no mountain cabin, 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Transcript of Record at 1547, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 
2013). In one chat the FBI deemed a fantasy, Valle told his chat partner “Jackcrow Two” that 
he would kidnap Andria, the same woman he promised to Aly Khan, by “stick[ing] [Andria] in 
the oven while she is still alive [but] at a relatively low heat.” United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 
53, 71 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014) (second alteration in original). 
 39. Transcript of Record at 655–56, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
27, 2013). 
 40. Transcript of Record at 1552, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 
2013). 
 41. Transcript of Record at 1409, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 
2013). 
 42. Transcript of Record at 1553, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 
2013). 
 43. Id. at 1556. 
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no basement or pulley apparatus, and no giant oven.44 And although 
Valle’s alleged co-conspirators purported to live in other countries, 
including Pakistan and the United Kingdom, they bought no plane 
tickets and made no hotel reservations for the dates of the alleged 
plots.45 
Additionally, the defense argued, Valle and his chat partners 
regularly set dates for each kidnapping attempt, and each date passed 
by with no further contact or communication about the attempt.46 
Never did one of Valle’s co-conspirators complain that he had failed 
to deliver a target as promised.47 Instead, the co-conspirators would 
pick up chatting about a new target and a new plan as if the previous 
plan had never existed.48 
Finally, the defense attempted to demonstrate to the jury that 
Valle’s chats were not as singularly aberrational as they might seem. 
To help demystify Dark Fetish Net, where Valle met his alleged co-
conspirators, the defense played a video deposition of Sergey 
Merenkov, the website’s founder, who testified that he created the 
site for fantasy, and that it had tens of thousands of members.49 
Additionally, defense counsel called as a witness their paralegal, who 
took the jury on a video tour of Dark Fetish Net to demonstrate that 
other users were engaging in activity similar to Valle’s.50 
2. Valle’s Off-line Activities.  The second prong of the 
prosecution’s case was evidence of Valle’s off-line activities, which, 
according to the prosecution, both satisfied the overt-act requirement 
of the conspiracy charge and proved that Valle intended that the 
kidnappings occur.51 These acts included giving Police Benevolent 
Association (PBA)52 cards to his alleged targets, searching for them in 
 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 1554–55. 
 46. Id. at 1552–53. 
 47. Id. at 1553. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Transcript of Record at 1357, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 
2013). 
 50. Id. at 1393. 
 51. Transcript of Record at 1526, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 
2013). 
 52. PBA cards are union-membership cards that police officers give to friends. If the friend 
is stopped for a traffic violation, she can show the card in hopes of lenient treatment from the 
officer. Transcript of Record at 1424–25, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
5, 2013). 
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the police database, and surveilling them under the guise of 
friendship.53 The alleged surveillance activities involved meeting one 
woman for brunch,54 visiting another woman at work,55 and 
occasionally texting or messaging various women.56 
The defense countered that these off-line actions were innocuous 
social gestures, just as consistent with innocent conduct as with 
conspiracy.57 For example, the defense elicited testimony that when 
meeting one of his alleged targets for brunch, Valle brought along his 
wife and infant daughter.58 The defense also called as a witness a 
police officer who testified about the common use of PBA cards to 
rebut the government’s implication that Valle was behaving 
suspiciously by giving PBA cards to his alleged targets.59 
Finally, along with those two lines of evidence, the prosecution 
presented the jury with a litany of pornographic images and videos 
Valle had viewed or saved to his computer,60 as well as his search 
histories (most notably, his visit to a website with the rather on-the-
nose title “howtomakechloroform.net”).61 These, the prosecution 
claimed, demonstrated Valle’s motivation for entering into the 
conspiracy, and bolstered the seriousness of his chats.62 The defense 
disputed this characterization, saying that Valle’s Internet history was 
equally consistent with a sick, but fantastical, fetish.63 
 
 53. Transcript of Record at 1528–30, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 7, 2013). 
 54. Id. at 1526. 
 55. Id. at 1541. 
 56. Id. at 1528, 1530. 
 57. Id. at 1570. 
 58. Id. at 1566–67. 
 59. Transcript of Record at 1426, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 
2013).  
 60. E.g., Transcript of Record at 1094, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 1, 2013) (describing an image found on Valle’s computer of a naked woman suspended 
upside-down). 
 61. Transcript of Record at 639, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 
2013). 
 62. Transcript of Record at 1596, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 
2013). 
 63. Id. at 1568. 
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B. The Conviction and Acquittal 
Ultimately, after sixteen hours of deliberation, the jury convicted 
Gilberto Valle of conspiracy to commit kidnapping.64 However, in a 
surprising turn of events, Judge Gardephe granted a judgment of 
acquittal just over a year later, in June 2014, on the basis of 
insufficient evidence.65 He wrote in his opinion, “Despite the highly 
disturbing nature of Valle’s deviant and depraved sexual interests, his 
chats and emails about these interests are not sufficient—standing 
alone—to make out the elements of conspiracy to commit 
kidnapping. There must be evidence that Valle intended to act on 
these interests with an alleged co-conspirator.”66 
The court echoed the defense’s doubts about the government’s 
characterization of the chats and emails as “real” instead of as 
fantasy, pointing out that the facts on which the government 
distinguished the two—such as negotiation over price or discussion of 
fear of getting caught—were present in both types of chats.67 
Furthermore, the court noted that several facts seemed to 
affirmatively suggest the chats were fantasy role-play, such as Valle’s 
lies to his alleged co-conspirators about his own identity as well as the 
identities of the alleged targets.68 
Finally, the court addressed the “unique circumstances” of a 
conspiracy “alleged to have taken place almost exclusively in 
cyberspace, and in a context in which . . . the Defendant engaged in 
countless fantasy role-play conversations.”69 The court wrote, “[I]n 
determining whether the Government proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt Valle’s criminal intent—his specific intent to actually kidnap a 
woman—the fact that no kidnappings took place and that no real-
world, concrete steps toward committing a kidnapping were ever 
undertaken, is significant.”70 
After exhaustively cataloging and analyzing the evidence, the 
court concluded that no reasonable jury could have found that the 
 
 64. Benjamin Weiser, ‘Ugly Thoughts’ Defense Fails; Officer Guilty in Cannibal Plot, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, at A1. 
 65. United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 66. Id. at 61–62. 
 67. Id. at 84–86. 
 68. See, e.g., id. at 98 (describing the false information Valle provided to then-anonymous 
user Moody Blues about himself and alleged target Kimberly Sauer). 
 69. Id. at 61. 
 70. Id. 
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government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Valle entered 
into genuine agreements, or had specific intent, to kidnap the women 
featured in his chats.71 The government has appealed this decision.72 
C. Other Fantasy-Defense Cases 
Gilberto Valle is not the only criminal defendant to raise the so-
called “fantasy defense.”73 The advent of the Internet has led to a 
number of cases in which defendants claimed that their online 
conduct merely expressed personal fantasies, and did not constitute 
criminal behavior. To begin with, the FBI’s investigation led not only 
to Valle’s arrest, but also to the arrest of one of his alleged co-
conspirators, Michael Van Hise, as well as two other individuals who 
engaged in similar communications.74 One man has pled guilty,75 and 
the other two were convicted by jury and are awaiting the judge’s 
rulings on their motions for acquittal.76 
The fantasy defense has also arisen in the prosecutions of other 
inchoate sex-related crimes.77 Perhaps the most notorious example is 
the case of well-known software developer Patrick Naughton. 
Naughton allegedly flew from Seattle to Los Angeles to meet his 
online chat correspondent, who described herself to Naughton as a 
thirteen-year-old girl, for sex.78 In fact, the “girl” was an FBI agent, 
and Naughton was charged with traveling in interstate commerce with 
 
 71. Id. at 102. 
 72. Notice of Appeal, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2014). 
 73. Chris Francescani, ‘Cannibal Cop’ Co-Defendants To Offer Same Fantasy Defense, 
REUTERS, Feb. 24, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/24/us-usa-crime-
cannibal-idUSBREA1N0UH20140224.  
 74. Daniel Engber, The Cannibal Cop Goes Free, but What About the Murderous 
Mechanic?, SLATE (July 2, 2014, 7:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
crime/2014/07/the_cannibal_cop_gilberto_valle_goes_free_what_about_michael_van_hise_and
.html.  
 75. Id. 
 76. See Motion for Judgment of Acquittal at 5, United States v. Van Hise, No. 12-cr-00847 
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2014) (requesting a judgment of acquittal for defendants Michael Van Hise 
and Robert Christopher Asch). 
 77. Donald S. Yamagami, Prosecuting Cyber-Pedophiles: How Can Intent Be Shown in a 
Virtual World in Light of the Fantasy Defense?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 549 (2001); see 
also United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1496 (6th Cir. 1997) (dismissing an indictment for 
communicating threats because the emails the defendant sent to another person—violent, 
sexual stories featuring a classmate as a character—took place in a mutual exchange of fantasy 
stories, and so defendant did not send them with intent to intimidate). 
 78. Greg Miller, In Sentencing Deal, No Jail Time for Ex-Online Exec in Sex Case, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2000, at 1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2000/aug/10/business/fi-2015. 
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the intent to have sex with a minor.79 Naughton claimed that he had 
always believed his correspondent to be an adult who was merely 
role-playing as a child.80 The jury hung, and Naughton eventually pled 
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement.81 
Analogous defenses have also emerged in cases that have little or 
no relation to sexual expression. In United States v. Myers,82 for 
instance, the defendant sought—unsuccessfully—to have his 
conviction for bribery overturned by arguing that his agreement to 
receive a bribe was mere “playacting.”83 Similarly, the Supreme Court 
has recently granted certiorari in Elonis v. United States,84 a case that 
presents issues comparable to those inherent in the fantasy defense. 
Anthony Douglas Elonis was convicted of transmitting threats in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), partly on the basis of rap “lyrics” he 
posted on Facebook in which he wrote about killing his estranged 
wife.85 Elonis argued on appeal that the First Amendment requires 
the government to prove he subjectively intended to make a threat, 
not just that a reasonable person would understand it as such, and 
that therefore his “lyrics” were protected speech.86 The Third Circuit 
disagreed, and upheld his conviction.87 
II.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EXPRESSION AND FANTASY 
Before it can be established that conspiracy law risks violating 
the First Amendment right to expression in cases like Valle’s, the 
precise contours of the right itself must be delineated. Under the First 
Amendment, unpopular or offensive expression cannot be restricted 
merely because the government disagrees with it,88 even if the speech 
in question advocates conduct proscribed by law.89 The Supreme 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 83. Id. at 831. 
 84. Elonis v. United States, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (June 
16, 2014) (No. 13–983), argued, Dec. 1, 2014. 
 85. Id. at 324–26, 327. 
 86. Id. at 327–28. 
 87. Id. at 335. 
 88. See Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (“[W]e have consistently 
held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its 
suppression.”). 
 89. Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689–90 
(1959). There is a narrow, historical exception for speech that “is directed to inciting or 
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Court has held that the government may not restrict expression on 
the basis of its content90 unless the restriction is narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling government interest.91 Application of this strict 
scrutiny “leaves few survivors.”92 For example, the government may 
not prohibit burning the American flag,93 showing a film that portrays 
adultery in a positive light,94 or posting racist symbols.95 
Like all rights, however, First Amendment rights are not 
unlimited in scope. Falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded theater is the 
archetypal example of speech that deserves no constitutional shield.96 
Though all speech is presumptively protected, there are two major 
lines of limitations on First Amendment rights. First, content-neutral 
regulations, which regulate speech for reasons other than its 
expressive impact, are subject to a relaxed standard of review.97 For 
example, the state may constitutionally prohibit playing music above 
a certain decibel threshold because the prohibition’s target is the 
volume of the music, not its expression.98 Second, even content-based 
restrictions of speech may escape strict scrutiny if they fall into 
historically recognized categories of exceptions.99 The fantasy defense 
to criminal conspiracy implicates two possible historical exceptions: 
the exception for obscenity and the exception for speech that is itself 
defined as criminal conduct. 
 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 90. To determine whether a regulation is based on the content of the regulated speech, the 
Court asks “whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of 
disagreement with the message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989). 
 91. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 92. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 455 (2002) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
 93. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990). 
 94. Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp., 360 U.S. at 689. 
 95. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). 
 96. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (originating the famous analogy). 
 97. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 98. See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of 
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 
1286 (2005) (explaining that a law barring noise louder than ninety decibels is “content-neutral 
as applied”); see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386 (noting that “[f]ighting words are thus analogous to 
a noisy sound truck”).  
 99. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010). For a list of all currently 
acknowledged First Amendment exceptions, see United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 
(2012). 
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A. The Obscenity Exception 
Under the obscenity exception, transmission, dissemination, and 
receipt of obscene materials receive no First Amendment 
protection.100 Although the Supreme Court has never held obscenity 
to be within the reach of the First Amendment, the Court has long 
struggled to define obscenity.101 In the “tortured history”102 of the 
exception, the Supreme Court has adopted and subsequently 
abandoned a number of methods for defining obscenity.103 
Under current doctrine, established by Miller v. California,104 
obscene materials are those which “depict or describe sexual 
conduct,” and “which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient 
interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive 
way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.”105 The Court further explained 
that only “‘hard core’ pornography,” not any depiction of sex, can 
qualify as “obscene” under this test.106 Thus, a state may prohibit 
distributing, for instance, only “[p]atently offensive representations or 
descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition 
of the genitals.”107 And even hard-core pornography will not qualify as 
obscene unless “‘the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest,”108 meaning that it appeals to 
“shameful or morbid interest in sex,”109 and not merely “normal, 
healthy sexual desires.”110  
The nature of the Miller test renders obscenity prosecutions on 
the basis of textual material exceedingly rare.111 In Kaplan v. 
 
 100. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (reaffirming that the First Amendment 
does not protect obscene material). 
 101. See id. at 37–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (detailing the Court’s different attempts to 
define obscenity). 
 102. Id. at 24 (majority opinion). 
 103. Id. at 37–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 104. Miller, 413 U.S. 15. 
 105. Id. at 24. 
 106. Id. at 29. 
 107. Id. at 25. 
 108. Id. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)). 
 109. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985). 
 110. Id. at 498.  
 111. Ryen Rasmus, Note, The Auto-Authentication of the Page: Purely Written Speech and 
the Doctrine of Obscenity, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 253, 254 (2011). 
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California,112 a companion case to Miller, the Court held that purely 
textual material was not categorically barred from qualifying as 
obscene under the Miller test.113 However, after Kaplan was handed 
down in 1973, thirty-five years passed before federal prosecutors 
successfully pursued an obscenity case for purely textual material.114 
In that case, the defendant, who had agoraphobia, pled guilty to avoid 
the stress of trial,115 and it is unclear whether the prosecution would 
have withstood a First Amendment challenge. 
The obscenity exception is further narrowed by a distinction 
between private and public obscenity. Though the government may 
prohibit disseminating or receiving obscene materials, it may not 
prohibit merely possessing or consuming them in private.116 In Stanley 
v. Georgia,117 the Court held such a prohibition impermissible because 
it relied on the “assertion that the State has the right to control the 
moral content of a person’s thoughts.”118 The Court further stated, “If 
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no 
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he 
may read or what films he may watch.”119 
In other words, private consumption and expression are not 
subject to the obscenity exception because there may exist some right 
to thought itself in the First Amendment. Extrapolating from this 
principle, lower courts have reasoned that the First Amendment 
protects the right to privately generate ideas as well.120 For example, 
the Tenth Circuit ruled on this basis that the forcible administration 
of antipsychotic drugs to a detainee in jail could have 
 
 112. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973). 
 113. Id. at 119–20. 
 114. Neil A. Lewis, A Prosecution Tests the Definition of Obscenity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 
2007, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/us/28obscene.html.  
 115. Paula Reed Ward, Afraid of Public Trial, Author To Plead Guilty in Online Obscenity 
Case, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 17, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.post-
gazette.com/frontpage/2008/05/17/Afraid-of-public-trial-author-to-plead-guilty-in-online-
obscenity-case/stories/200805170216. 
 116. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
 117. Stanley, 394 U.S. 557. 
 118. Id. at 565. 
 119. Id.  
 120. See, e.g., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393–94 (10th Cir. 1984) (“The First 
Amendment protects the communication of ideas, which itself implies protection of the capacity 
to produce ideas.”). 
EK IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2015  8:11 PM 
916 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:901 
unconstitutionally violated his First Amendment rights by interfering 
with his ability to think as he wished.121 
The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the question 
of whether private, noncommercial emails containing obscene textual 
descriptions fall within Stanley’s protection. However, the Court has 
upheld prohibitions on importing obscene materials for private use,122 
and on distributing obscene material through the mail.123 The Fourth 
Circuit is the only federal appellate court so far to apply this line of 
precedent to the email context. In a highly controversial opinion, it 
held that obscene emails are no different from any other obscene 
material transported through the stream of interstate commerce, and 
thus deserve no Stanley protection.124 
Therefore, under the obscenity exception, a state is likely within 
its rights to regulate the distribution of the gruesome pornography 
spotlighted in cases like Gilberto Valle’s. Assuming the government 
could have satisfied the Miller test,125 it could have legitimately 
prohibited Valle from purchasing pornography or from sharing his 
pornography with others on Dark Fetish Net. However, the First 
Amendment does protect Gilberto Valle’s personal use of 
pornographic materials. Additionally, the textual content of Valle’s 
chats and emails—which was necessary to, and formed the bulk of the 
evidence in, his conspiracy prosecution—also probably falls outside 
the obscenity exception. Textual material, as a general principle, is 
unlikely to qualify as obscene under Miller,126 and Valle’s chats 
contain relatively little in the way of hard-core descriptions of sexual 
conduct. Thus, unless another exception applies, Valle’s chats likely 
qualify as protected speech under the First Amendment. 
 
 121. Id. at 1395.  
 122. United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973). 
 123. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971). 
 124. United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 332–33 (4th Cir. 2008). For an example of 
criticism and discussion of this decision, see Christopher Shea, Obscenity Law: Still a 
Hodgepodge?, BRAINIAC (July 9, 2009), http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/brainiac/
2009/07/obscenity_law_s.html; Eugene Volokh, Obscenity Conviction for Adult-to-Adult 
Noncommercial E-mail About (Fantasy) Sex with Children, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 16, 
2009), http://www.volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_06_14-2009_06_20.shtml#1245192215.  
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 104–15. 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 111–15. 
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B. Speech That Doubles as Criminal Conduct 
Of course, some would argue that evaluating Gilberto Valle’s 
case under the obscenity exception misses the point: although the 
heinous nature of his fantasies was naturally a focus at trial, he was 
charged with criminal conspiracy, not mere possession or 
transmission of pornography. Thus, this Note turns now to the second 
strain of First Amendment reasoning implicated by the fantasy 
defense: expression that is itself the prohibited actus reus of a 
criminal offense, or—put another way—speech that doubles as 
criminal conduct. 
Although the First Amendment protects speech that advocates 
criminal conduct127 as well as speech that could lead to criminal 
conduct,128 it offers no protection for actual criminal conduct merely 
because it involves thought or expression.129 As the Supreme Court 
has noted, “The fantasies of a drug addict are his own and beyond the 
reach of government, but government regulation of drug sales is not 
prohibited by the Constitution.”130 Conspiracy poses an interesting 
problem in this framework because the actus reus of the crime—
agreement—is pure expression. 
Throughout history, both practitioners and scholars have 
assumed that the First Amendment has little to say about conspiracy 
and similar crimes.131 In 1949, the Supreme Court decisively stated in 
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.132 that the First Amendment 
offers no protection for speech “used as an integral part of conduct in 
violation of a valid criminal statute,”133 but apparently felt no need to 
 
 127. Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689–90 
(1959). But see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (delineating an exception for 
speech that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action”). 
 128. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969) (“Given the present state of 
knowledge, the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground 
that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the 
ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits.”). 
 129. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973); see United States v. Williams, 
553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008) (holding that requests to obtain child pornography are not protected by 
the First Amendment because “[m]any long established criminal proscriptions—such as laws 
against conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation—criminalize speech . . . that is intended to 
induce or commence illegal activities”). 
 130. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 67–68. 
 131. Volokh, supra note 98, at 1284. 
 132. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). 
 133. Id. at 498. 
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explain what qualifies as “integral,” or to offer any reasoning behind 
this seeming tautology.134 Since then, most case law examining the 
intersection between conspiracy and the First Amendment has 
focused on situations in which the goal of the conspiracy involves 
protected speech.135 However, the fantasy defense raises the question 
of whether the alleged conspiracy agreement itself can ever be 
protected. Although speech that doubles as criminal conduct—such 
as in conspiracy, perjury, and aiding-and-abetting offenses—
presumably fits within the broader Giboney exception of speech 
integral to criminal conduct,136 the Supreme Court has only recently 
begun to attempt to explain why speech that doubles as criminal 
conduct is excluded from First Amendment protection.137 
1. The Speech-As-Conduct Rationale.  In previous years, most 
scholars believed that expression in these types of crimes was exempt 
from protection because it fell within the “speech as conduct” rule the 
Court applied in other circumstances.138 This rule distinguishes 
between speech restricted for its expressive content and speech 
restricted for its non-expressive aspects.139 In this view, for instance, 
punishing a defendant for perjury is analogous to punishing a 
defendant for playing his music too loudly; what is being punished is 
not the content of the lie itself, but the conduct of lying. In his 1989 
 
 134. See Volokh, supra note 98, at 1314 (“[N]one of the obvious interpretations of 
Giboney’s rather ambiguous language makes much sense.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360–63 (2003) (addressing whether conspiracy 
to unlawfully burn crosses passes First Amendment muster); United States v. Mehanna, 735 
F.3d 32, 49 (1st Cir. 2013) (deciding that a conviction for conspiracy to provide material support 
to a terrorist organization is constitutional under the First Amendment even when the material 
support at hand was the translation of jihadist texts). 
 136. Although speech that doubles as crime likely fits within the “speech integral to criminal 
conduct” exception, that exception is broader. For instance, this category also includes non-
obscene child pornography, possession of which the Court has ruled is unprotected based not on 
its content, but on its status as the product of sexual abuse. United States v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 762–63 (1982); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002) 
(explaining that the First Amendment applies to artificially generated, non-obscene child 
pornography because in Ferber, “[t]he production of the work, not its content, was the target of 
the statute”). Because the precise outline of the speech-integral-to-criminal-conduct category is 
unclear, and because it seems to encompass more than just speech that doubles as criminal 
conduct, this Note limits its discussion to the narrower category. 
 137. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008) (explaining that offers to give or 
receive unlawful items have no social value, and therefore, like “conspiracy and solicitation,” 
are not protected by the First Amendment). 
 138. Volokh, supra note 98, at 1282–83. 
 139. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (explaining that 
“[f]ighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound truck”). 
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survey of First Amendment law, Professor Kent Greenawalt posited 
that conspiracy agreement fits into this doctrine because it is a 
“situation-altering utterance”—speech that alters the expectations 
and felt obligations of the listener—rendering agreement more like 
an act than like expression.140 Thus, in Greenawalt’s view, conspiracy 
is not a true exception to the First Amendment’s protections, but is 
simply not expression. 
In more recent years, scholars such as Professor Eugene Volokh 
have criticized what they view as a false distinction between conduct 
and speech inherent in Greenawalt’s argument.141 For instance, 
Volokh argues that giving a speech advocating a boycott might create 
a feeling of moral obligation in the listeners to do as the speaker says 
because of the persuasive nature of his speech.142 However, such a 
speech, far from being exempted as “conduct” from First 
Amendment protection, is a classic example of political expression, 
unquestionably falling within the First Amendment’s ambit.143 Thus, 
Volokh argues, speech that doubles as criminal conduct must be 
understood as a true exception to the First Amendment.144 
2. The Battle of the True-Exception Rationales.  This scholarly 
debate was resolved, however temporarily, in 2008 by United States v. 
Williams,145 in which the defendant argued that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252A(a)(3)(B), a statute criminalizing offers to provide and 
requests to obtain child pornography, was facially invalid under the 
First Amendment because it prohibited a “substantial amount of 
 
 140. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 57–58 (1989). 
 141. See William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. 
REV. 107, 114 (1982) (“It is futile to argue that an appropriately tailored law that punishes any 
or all of these utterances does not abridge speech. It does, it is meant to, and one should not 
take recourse to verbal subterfuge, e.g., that it is ‘speech-brigaded with-action’ or ‘conduct’ 
alone that is curtailed by laws reaching these cases.”); Volokh, supra note 98, at 1330–31 (“But 
why should a statement’s creating a felt moral obligation turn that statement from 
presumptively constitutionally protected speech into unprotected conduct? After all, there are 
many social conventions under which the making of a statement will be seen by some as 
increasing the speaker’s moral obligations, or increasing or decreasing the listener’s moral 
obligations.”); see also Steven R. Morrison, Conspiracy Law’s Threat to Free Speech, 15 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 865, 910–11 (2013) (proposing a reformulation of Greenawalt’s structure that 
distinguishes between “operational” and “aspirational” speech). 
 142. Volokh, supra note 98, at 1331–32. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1337–38. 
 145. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008). 
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protected speech.”146 Citing Giboney, the Supreme Court explicitly 
held—for the first time—that the crime of solicitation garnered no 
First Amendment protection. Rather than distinguish between speech 
and speech-as-conduct to take solicitation outside of First 
Amendment protection, the Court seemed to recognize solicitation as 
a true exception, premised “on the principle that offers to give or 
receive what it is unlawful to possess have no social value and thus, 
like obscenity, enjoy no First Amendment protection.”147 
This justification echoed the Court’s analysis in many other First 
Amendment−exception cases.148 For instance, in the seminal case 
United States v. Roth,149 the Court justified the obscenity exception on 
the basis of its estimation that obscenity is “utterly without redeeming 
social importance.”150 Other First Amendment contexts in which the 
Court has used this line of reasoning include child pornography that 
does not rise to Miller’s obscenity standard,151 fighting words,152 and 
defamation.153 Furthermore, the Williams Court implied that its 
reasoning applied not only to solicitation, but also to the expression 
inherent in conspiracy and incitement, because they are all 
“speech . . . that is intended to induce or commence illegal 
activities.”154 
However, the Court deemphasized the lack-of-social-value 
rationale a mere two years later in United States v. Stevens.155 In 
Stevens, the government argued that First Amendment jurisprudence, 
including Roth and Williams, established a test under which the First 
Amendment extends only to expression that meets a minimum 
 
 146. Id. at 292. 
 147. Id. at 298 (emphasis added). 
 148. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (finding an exception 
to First Amendment protection for expression deemed “obscene . . . profane . . . or libelous”). 
 149. United States v. Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
 150. Id. at 484. 
 151. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762–63 (1982) (“The value of permitting live 
performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is 
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”). 
 152. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (“It has been well observed that such utterances are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality.”). 
 153. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257 (1952) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 
571–72) (finding that epithets, personal abuse, or “fighting words” do not constitute 
communication for First Amendment purposes). 
 154. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008). 
 155. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010). 
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threshold of social value.156 Under this test, the government argued, a 
statute outlawing “crush videos,” films of animal killing or cruelty, 
was valid under the First Amendment because such videos have a de 
minimis social value that is outweighed by society’s interest in 
morality and order.157 
The Court flatly rejected “permit[ting] the Government to 
imprison any speaker so long as his speech is deemed valueless or 
unnecessary, or so long as an ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits tilts 
in a statute’s favor.”158 Rather, the Court held that solicitation, 
obscenity, and other excepted forms of speech escape First 
Amendment protection not because of “cost-benefit analysis” but 
because they belong to “historic and traditional categories [of 
exceptions] long familiar to the bar.”159 Because not all crush videos 
prohibited by the statute fell within one of these categories, the 
statute was unconstitutional.160 
In many ways, the decision in Stevens was protective of First 
Amendment rights. By refusing to expand exceptions to First 
Amendment protections to the kind of almost-but-not-quite 
obscenity at hand in Stevens, the Court affirmed that legislative 
determinations of social value could not control the constitutionality 
of government restriction of expressive speech. However, by 
retracting the lack-of-social-value rationale for obscenity and speech 
that doubles as criminal conduct, the Stevens Court suggested that a 
long pedigree is the sole and sufficient justification for their exclusion 
from First Amendment protection. For obscenity cases, this holding 
has little practical effect: the guiding principles of the exception, 
including social-value determinations, are already baked in the cake 
of the Miller test. However, for speech that doubles as criminal 
conduct, the absence of a principled rationale renders it difficult to 
precisely delineate the scope of the exception. 
First, it cannot be seriously suggested that actual conspiracy and 
solicitation should categorically gain First Amendment protection; 
such a shift would put an end to criminal convictions that are both 
 
 156. Reply Brief for the United States at 11–12, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 
2564714. 
 157. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469–70. 
 158. Id. at 471. 
 159. Id. at 468.  
 160. Id. at 474–75. 
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legitimate and necessary for public safety.161 On the other hand, it 
seems problematic to claim that First Amendment considerations can 
never have a place in these prosecutions, particularly in the fantasy-
defense context. After all, if a defendant is convicted of conspiracy 
when his “conspiracy” agreement was, in fact, fantasy, his wrongful 
conviction not only punishes him for a crime he did not commit, but 
also punishes his entirely protected speech—an impermissible result 
under the First Amendment.162 
C. Evidence Law in the Shadow of the First Amendment 
Although Stevens has made it clear that conspiracy agreement is 
not categorically protected by the First Amendment, even speech that 
allegedly doubles as criminal conduct might require First Amendment 
protection in some circumstances. After all, a criminal prosecution 
can run a serious risk of punishing a defendant for the unpopularity of 
his expression, rather than for his actual guilt. In these types of cases, 
the courts have demonstrated some willingness to adopt heightened 
evidentiary standards, sometimes by institution of doctrinal 
protections, and sometimes only in practice, to control for this First 
Amendment risk. 
Although the First Amendment is not understood to apply as a 
general evidentiary privilege, the Supreme Court has created 
prophylactic evidentiary doctrines for specific types of cases that have 
the potential to punish defendants for protected expression.163 For 
instance, the Court has held that in defamation cases, the First 
 
 161. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1326–27 (2003) 
(explaining how conspiracy law prevents sophisticated individuals who lead criminal 
undertakings from insulating themselves from personal criminal liability). 
 162. This is unlike, say, a conviction for possession of obscene materials in which the jury 
was improperly instructed as to the legal definition of obscenity. In that type of case, the 
defendant’s First Amendment rights are violated whether or not the alleged factual basis of the 
charge is true. In the fantasy-defense context, a conviction does not punish the defendant’s 
protected First Amendment expression when the alleged factual basis of the charge—that the 
communication was the actual conspiracy agreement—is true. 
 163. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994) (listing some examples and stating 
that “we have often held some procedures—a particular allocation of the burden of proof, a 
particular quantum of proof, a particular type of appellate review, and so on—to be 
constitutionally required in proceedings that may penalize protected speech”); Peter E. Quint, 
Toward First Amendment Limitations on the Introduction of Evidence: The Problem of United 
States v. Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J. 1622, 1648–51 (1977) (listing cases in which the Court has 
adopted special evidentiary rules to protect speech); see also Robert P. Faulkner, Evidence of 
First Amendment Activity at Trial: The Articulation of a Higher Evidentiary Standard, 42 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1994) (evaluating Quint’s discussion). 
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Amendment requires a plaintiff who is a public official to bear the 
burden of proof in showing “actual malice,”164 and also to prove actual 
malice by clear and convincing evidence.165 In another case, the Court 
struck down a state constitutional provision that placed the burden of 
proof on a taxpayer to show that he had not engaged in “advocacy of 
‘the overthrow of Government . . . by unlawful means’” to qualify for 
a tax exemption for veterans, on the grounds that the government 
may not restrict speech by manipulation of evidentiary presumptions 
any more than it may by direct regulation.166 
For speech that doubles as criminal conduct, like conspiracy, the 
Supreme Court has not articulated similar heightened evidentiary 
standards. However, the Court acknowledged possible First 
Amendment problems for crimes like conspiracy in Noto v. United 
States167 and Scales v. United States168—companion cases involving the 
Smith Act’s membership clause, which criminalized being an active 
member of a group that planned violent overthrow of the government 
with the specific intent that the group’s illegal goals be 
accomplished.169 The Court emphasized that the specific-intent 
element, “like [the] others, must be judged strictissimi juris” to avoid 
impugning the First Amendment freedom of association, “for 
otherwise there is a danger that one in sympathy with the legitimate 
aims of such an organization, but not specifically intending to 
accomplish them by resort to violence, might be punished for his 
adherence to lawful and constitutionally protected purposes.”170 
Although Scales and Noto are most fairly read as a reminder of 
the importance of holding the government to its usual burden of 
proof, some lower courts have taken them as an invitation to 
articulate their own heightened evidentiary standards in prosecutions 
of speech that doubles as crime.171 The First Circuit’s widely cited 
 
 164. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). 
 165. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
 166. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520, 528–29 (1958). “The vice of the present procedure 
is that, where particular speech falls close to the line separating the lawful and the unlawful, the 
possibility of mistaken factfinding—inherent in all litigation—will create the danger that the 
legitimate utterance will be penalized.” Id. at 526. 
 167. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). 
 168. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
 169. Id. at 205–06. 
 170. Noto, 367 U.S. at 299–300. 
 171. See Hellman v. United States, 298 F.2d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 1961) (overturning a Smith 
Act conviction where the government failed to prove specific intent strictissimi juris, and 
holding that specific intent could be proven by “activity . . . which is explainable on no other 
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opinion in United States v. Spock172 contains perhaps the broadest 
application of these decisions. Spock was convicted of conspiracy to 
aid and abet Selective Service registrants in avoiding service based on 
his participation in an anti-draft group.173 Some of the group’s rhetoric 
was purely political, but some members of the group also advocated 
for the burning of draft cards and other illegal resistance.174 Spock 
argued that his part in the group’s activities consisted solely of 
political expression, not conspiracy to commit illegal acts, and should 
therefore gain First Amendment protection.175 The First Circuit, citing 
Scales and Noto, held: 
When the alleged agreement is both bifarious and political within 
the shadow of the First Amendment, we hold that an individual’s 
specific intent to adhere to the illegal portions may be shown in one 
of three ways: by the individual defendant’s prior or subsequent 
unambiguous statements; by the individual defendant’s subsequent 
commission of the very illegal act contemplated by the agreement; 
or by the individual defendant’s subsequent legal act if that act is 
“clearly undertaken for the specific purpose of rendering effective 
the later illegal activity which is advocated.”176 
In addition to these special prophylactic doctrines, in practice, 
the Supreme Court and lower courts sometimes import First 
Amendment concerns into what is purported to be application of 
ordinary evidentiary rules.177 In Dawson v. Delaware,178 for instance, 
the Supreme Court held that although no per se ban on evidence of 
First Amendment−protected activity exists at sentencing, admitting 
evidence of a criminal defendant’s ties to the Aryan Brotherhood in 
his sentencing for murder violated his First Amendment right to 
 
basis than that [a defendant] personally intended to bring about the overthrow of the 
Government as speedily as circumstances would permit”); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 
173 (1st Cir. 1969). 
 172. Spock, 416 F.2d 165. 
 173. Id. at 168. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. at 169 (raising First Amendment issues considering the public nature of some of 
the acts of the defendants). 
 176. Id. at 173 (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 234 (1961)). 
 177. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1992); see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 
180 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion on my understanding that in 
heeding these admonitions [about relevance analysis], the district court must ensure that the 
values protected by the First Amendment, though entitled to no constitutional privilege in a 
case of this kind, are weighed carefully in striking a proper balance.”).  
 178. Dawson, 503 U.S. 159. 
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freedom of association.179 According to the Court, the defendant’s 
membership in the organization demonstrated only his “abstract 
beliefs,” which, in the Court’s estimation, were irrelevant to 
character, even under the relatively lax evidentiary standards of the 
sentencing phase.180  Although the Court purported to apply its typical 
relevance analysis to reach this result, Justice Thomas in dissent was 
skeptical that a defendant’s moral beliefs could ever be “irrelevant” 
to character, and suggested that the Court in fact applied a higher 
relevance standard, seemingly to protect the defendant from being 
punished for the content of his thoughts in violation of the First 
Amendment.181 
Like the Supreme Court in Dawson, the lower courts have in 
practice adopted heightened evidentiary standards for evidence that 
poses a risk of punishing a defendant for First Amendment activity, 
particularly in Rule 403 analyses.182 Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence states that relevant evidence may be excluded when its 
probative value is “substantially outweighed” by the risk of “unfair 
prejudice” to the party against whom the evidence is offered.183 In one 
instance of Rule 403 analysis in the shadow of the First Amendment, 
the Fifth Circuit explicitly gave weight to First Amendment concerns 
in excluding evidence of a medical society’s meeting, stating, 
“Admissibility, we think, should be governed by a test that weighs the 
probativeness of and the plaintiff’s need for the evidence against the 
danger that admission of the evidence will prejudice the defendant’s 
[F]irst [A]mendment rights.”184 On similar grounds, the Seventh 
Circuit excluded evidence that banks lobbied together that was 
 
 179. Id. Freedom of association is not expressly mentioned in the text of the First 
Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that it is protected by the First Amendment right 
to expression. Id. at 163–64. 
 180. Id. at 168. In the sentencing phase of a criminal trial, the standard rules of evidence do 
not apply. Furthermore, even at the trial stage, evidence is not inadmissible simply by virtue of 
constituting expression within the meaning of the First Amendment. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 
U.S. 476, 489 (1993). 
 181. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 173–76 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas excoriated the 
majority for obscuring its true reasoning, finding it implausible that gang membership was 
anything but highly relevant in sentencing to help a jury determine the defendant’s character 
and dangerousness. Id. 
 182. See, e.g., Walther v. FEC, 82 F.R.D. 200, 202 (D.D.C. 1979) (recognizing “that 
discovery may be restricted when it unnecessarily interferes with [F]irst [A]mendment 
activity”).  
 183. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 184. Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 n.7 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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purported to show that they collaborated in a price-fixing scheme.185 It 
held the evidence inadmissible under Rule 403 because admission 
“could easily result in a finding of antitrust liability for engaging in 
the First Amendment right to petition which Noerr-Pennington 
protects.”186 
As in those cases, fantasy-defense cases implicate the concern 
that a defendant will be punished for his First Amendment activity, 
rather than the charged crime. This danger is arguably greater for 
defendants claiming gruesome fantasies as a defense than it is, for 
instance, for defendants engaging in lobbying activity. The 
inflammatory nature of the fantasies, combined with the difficulty of 
drawing the line between fantasy and conspiracy, makes clear the 
serious constitutional issues in fantasy-defense cases. 
III.  THE ACTUS REUS REQUIREMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW 
It is a cherished maxim of criminal law that “evil intent alone” 
may not be punished.187 Rather, criminal law’s traditional actus reus 
requirement expresses “the feeling that the individual thinking evil 
thoughts must be protected from a state which may class him as a 
threat to its security.”188 This has not always been the case: for 
instance, it was once a crime in England to “compass or imagine, the 
death of the king.”189 For the past several centuries, however, action 
has been firmly established as a prerequisite to punishment.190 
Ancient maxims aside, there are obvious practical barriers 
associated with prosecuting thought: namely, the difficulty of knowing 
what lies within another person’s mind.191 Indeed, to demonstrate the 
necessity of the actus reus doctrine, criminal-law textbooks have 
resorted to imagining dystopian futures in which the government can 
 
 185. Weit v. Cont’l Illinois Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 641 F.2d 457, 467 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 186. Id. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, private entities are not liable under the 
Sherman Act for having attempted to influence the passage of laws “even though the resulting 
official action damaged other competitors at whom the campaign was aimed.” United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965). However, Pennington notes that 
evidence of such activity in proceedings based on other violations of the Sherman Act is subject 
to only ordinary evidentiary rules. Id. at 670 n.3. 
 187. Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy To Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 405 
(1959). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 405 n.1. 
 190. Id. at 405. 
 191. See id. (describing the actus reus requirement as “[r]ooted in skepticism about the 
ability . . . to know what passes through the minds of men”). 
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read brainwaves with cutting-edge technology,192 or science-fiction 
scenarios in which psychics can predict crimes long before their 
commission.193 
However, these speculative mind-reading tools are no longer 
necessary to give the government a window into a person’s thoughts. 
Rather, individuals proclaim their ponderings publicly over Twitter, 
Facebook, and other social-media sites, or privately in emails, chats, 
and online journals.194 Law enforcement regularly accesses social 
media as a crime-fighting tool,195 and we now know that even our most 
private and secure online activities are subject to scrutiny by the 
federal government.196 
But despite our apparent willingness to share our innermost 
thoughts online, popular opinion rebels at the notion of thoughtcrime 
as representing the epitome of Orwellian overreach.197 For instance, 
some critics have invoked the concept to denounce the recent 
institution of hate-crime legislation, arguing that punishment 
enhancements based on unacceptable thoughts like racial animus 
allow criminal law to intrude too far into men’s minds.198 Like the 
rationales underpinning the First Amendment, this understanding of 
the actus reus requirement relies on values of personal liberty and the 
free exchange of ideas. 
 
 192. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CRIMINAL LAW 129 (6th ed. 2012) (discussing a study in which psychologists could identify ten 
out of twelve mock terrorists by their brainwaves). 
 193. See id. (discussing the 2002 film Minority Report); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Advances in the psychic and related sciences may 
bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. . . . Can it be that the 
Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?”). 
 194. See Chris Rose, The Security Implications of Ubiquitous Social Media, 15 INT’L J. OF 
MGMT. & INFO. SYS. 35, 36 (2011) (“Society is changing, norms are changing, confidentiality is 
being replaced by openness. If you join . . . social media sites, this means giving up some privacy, 
but millions of people are willing do so just to be a part of this social media phenomenon.”). 
 195. See Heather Kelly, Police Embrace Social Media as a Crime-Fighting Tool, CNN (Aug. 
30, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/30/tech/social-media/fighting-crime-social-
media (reporting that 80 percent of law-enforcement officers who use social media use it for 
their investigations).  
 196. See, e.g., James Glanz & Andrew W. Lehren, U.S. and Britain Extended Spying to 1,000 
Targets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2013, at A1 (reporting that the U.S. and British governments were 
spying on the email traffic, phone calls, and other communications of over one thousand people, 
including government officials of other countries). 
 197. See, e.g., Robert J. Corry, Jr., Burn This Article: It Is Evidence in Your Thought Crime 
Prosecution, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 461, 461–62, 468–70 (2000) (referencing George Orwell’s 
novel 1984 to argue that hate crime is thoughtcrime and thus impermissible). 
 198. See, e.g., id. at 468–70. 
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Of course, some might argue that there is a distinction between 
punishing thoughts and punishing expression—just as there is a 
distinction between punishing someone for thinking about killing the 
king and punishing someone for talking about killing the king. One 
could conceive of the latter act as a thoughtcrime or not, depending 
on whether the speaker is ultimately punished for her expression’s 
thought-content—wishing the king was dead—or for her effort to 
actually bring about such a result—such as asking a hitman to kill the 
king. 
Not only does the actus reus requirement protect against 
punishing expression for its thought-content as an end in itself, but it 
also protects against wrongly punishing expression because of an 
incorrect belief that it will lead to harmful action. In other words, it 
ensures that only those who truly threaten society are punished, by 
“seek[ing] to assure that the evil intent of the man branded a criminal 
has been expressed in a manner signifying harm to society; that there 
is no longer any substantial likelihood that he will be deterred by the 
threat of sanction; and that there has been an identifiable 
occurrence.”199 Concluding that a given expression of fantasy will lead 
to action requires two inferential steps: first, the inference that the 
expressed fantasy represents actual desire, and second, the inference 
that the desire will lead to action. Both inferences are highly 
problematic—for example, although multitudes of beleaguered 
employees may fantasize about the office burning down, most would 
not actually want such an event to pass, and fewer still would take 
action to bring it to fruition.200 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that sexual fantasy is no 
exception to this principle. First, sexual fantasies do not necessarily 
represent actual desires.201 For instance, although many women 
fantasize about rape, that fantasy does not reflect a desire to be 
raped.202 Similarly, many men and women who fantasize about same-
sex encounters nonetheless identify as heterosexual.203 Second, though 
deviant sexual fantasies are almost universal, they are rarely acted 
 
 199. Goldstein, supra note 187, at 405. 
 200. See OFFICE SPACE (Twentieth Century Fox 1999) (portraying an employee burning 
down his office as a twist ending, even though the employees of the office are generally unhappy 
with their jobs). 
 201. See SIMON LEVAY & JANICE BALDWIN, HUMAN SEXUALITY 235 (4th ed. 2012) 
(explaining that rape fantasies do not reflect a desire to be raped). 
 202. Id. at 234–35. 
 203. Id. at 233. 
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upon.204 In one study, researchers found that although almost all of 
those who participated in deviant sexual behavior had fantasized 
about it at some point, the reverse was not true: most of those with 
deviant sexual fantasies had never acted on them.205  
The inferential steps are even more attenuated for cannibal 
fetishists. Startlingly, fantasizing about cannibalism is prevalent 
enough to warrant its own psychological terminology (vorarephilia) 
and Internet slang (vore).206 Dark Fetish Net, the website Gilberto 
Valle used, has hundreds of users who list cannibalism as a fetish,207 
and other vore sites boast membership in the tens of thousands.208 
However, among these scores of cannibalism enthusiasts, there has 
been only one recorded case of a vore-forum user actually committing 
cannibalism: a German man who killed and ate his victim at the 
victim’s own request.209 Moreover, forum users often state in their 
profiles that they are interested only in fantasy, and, outside the 
context of role-play, widely affirm their unwillingness to actually eat 
human beings.210 
Thus, although modern technology allows the government to 
engage in some “mind-reading,” the tenets of criminal law prohibit 
 
 204. See Kevin M. Williams, Barry S. Cooper, Teresa M. Howell, John C. Yuille & Delroy 
L. Paulhus, Inferring Sexually Deviant Behavior from Corresponding Fantasies: The Role of 
Personality and Pornography Consumption, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 198, 205–06 (2008) 
(finding that 95 percent of the study subjects had deviant sexual fantasies, but only 38 percent of 
those with deviant sexual fantasies had acted on them). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Amy D. Lykins & James M. Cantor, Vorarephilia: A Case Study in Masochism and 
Erotic Consumption, 43 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 181, 181 (2014). 
 207. See Members List, DARK FETISH NETWORK, http://darkfetishnet.com/
search_advanced.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2015) (yielding through search 252 users who list 
cannibalism as their “main fetish,” and an additional 112 who list it as another “fetish interest”). 
 208. See Josh Kurp, Cannibal Seeking Same: A Visit to the Online World of Flesh-Eaters, 
THE AWL (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.theawl.com/2011/03/cannibals-seeking-same-a-visit-to-
the-online-world-of-flesh-eaters (describing Dolcett Girls Forum, a site dedicated to 
cannibalism fetishes with over forty thousand members). 
 209. See Daniel Politi, German Police Officer Arrested in Alleged Cannibalism Case, SLATE 
(Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2013/11/29/german_police_officer_
arrested_in_alleged_cannibalism_case.html (describing a current case in which if suspicions of 
fetishistic cannibalism are confirmed, it will be the second time such a crime has been 
committed in Germany).  
 210. On the vore forum Dolcett Girls, one commenter in a thread called “Would you? 
Really?” asked: “If presented with an opportunity to Eat a Female in a ‘Dolcett-ish’ fantasy 
fulfillment . . . would you?” Kurp, supra note 208. In a response typical of the thread, one user 
replied, “In the end, I think I would probably avoid it in real life. Nice to think about, wonderful 
to see animated or made into a movie, but I’ve seen enough blood and other really nasty things 
in my life (some of them done to me) that I really don’t want to feel the rest of that blade.” Id. 
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punishment until it is clear that thoughts will lead to harm. Both 
popular notions of personal liberty and the attenuated relationship 
between thought and action necessitate this conclusion. The actus 
reus requirement is therefore necessary to protect these criminal law 
ideals, particularly in fantasy-defense cases. 
IV.  CONSPIRACY LAW’S THREAT TO THOUGHT AND FANTASY 
The heart of criminal conspiracy is agreement to achieve—rather 
than proximity to achieving—an unlawful goal.211 Its basis is the 
assumption that “to unite, back of a criminal purpose, the strength, 
opportunities and resources of many is obviously more dangerous and 
more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer.”212 In 
other words, as long as he has agreed with another to commit a crime, 
a defendant can be arrested for conspiracy well before he has even 
come close to achieving his purpose.213 
This feature of conspiracy—“that darling of the modern 
prosecutor’s nursery,”214 as Judge Learned Hand called it—has led to 
its dramatic expansion in recent decades.215 Conspiracy has two major 
functions that make it “an increasingly important weapon in the 
prosecutor’s armory.”216 First, conspiracy operates as an inchoate 
offense that allows law enforcement to intervene early in criminal 
activity and prevent its harms.217 Second, a judicial finding of 
 
 211. See Goldstein, supra note 187, at 406 (“[C]onspiracy doctrine comes closest to making a 
state of mind the occasion for preventive action against those who threaten society but who 
have come nowhere near carrying out the threat. No effort is made to find the point at which 
criminal intent is transformed into the beginnings of action dangerous to the community.”). In 
fact, under the common-law definition, conspiracy does not even require an unlawful goal, but 
can be premised on an agreement to achieve a lawful goal by unlawful means. People v. Carter, 
330 N.W.2d 314, 319 (Mich. 1982). 
 212. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448–49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 213. See Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 924 (1959) 
(“When the defendant has chosen to act in concert with others, rather than to act alone, the 
point of justifiable intervention is reached at an earlier stage.”). 
 214. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925). 
 215. See Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time To Turn Back from an Ever 
Expanding, Ever More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 8 (1992) (describing a 
“substantial increase” in federal conspiracy prosecutions between 1952 and 1992). 
 216. Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 213, at 922. 
 217. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975) (“[A]t some point in the continuum 
between preparation and consummation, the likelihood of a commission of an act is sufficiently 
great and the criminal intent sufficiently well formed to justify the intervention of the criminal 
law.”). 
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conspiracy triggers procedural218 and evidentiary219 advantages that 
allow defendants to be implicated in criminal activity for which they 
might otherwise escape liability.220 
However, critics allege that these functions, while useful, are 
vulnerable to abuse and carry a “serious threat to fairness in our 
administration of justice.”221 Conspiracy law endangers both the First 
Amendment right to thought and fantasy, as well as the ideal—
manifested in criminal law’s actus reus requirement—that only 
expression and conduct posing an actual risk of harm may be 
punished.222 The threat originates from two unique and interrelated 
features of conspiracy law. First, because conspiracy seeks to punish 
agreement itself rather than an independent act, more than any other 
crime, conspiracy “comes closest to making a state of mind the 
occasion for preventive action.”223 Second, prosecutors have 
unparalleled flexibility in proving conspiracy, heightening the risk 
that a defendant will be convicted for what he thinks rather than for 
what he does.224 
A. Conspiracy and the Actus Reus 
Ironically, given these criticisms, conspiracy is often described as 
requiring not just one, but two acts.225 First, the defendant must 
intentionally agree with another to achieve an unlawful purpose.226 
Second, the defendant must take some overt action in furtherance of 
 
 218. Most notably, the Pinkerton doctrine under federal law allows one conspirator to be 
held liable for all acts of the other conspirators that were taken in furtherance of the conspiracy 
and were reasonably foreseeable. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946). 
Additionally, a finding of conspiracy allows all of the alleged conspirators to be charged in any 
jurisdiction where any overt act took place. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 365–67 (1912). 
 219. Namely, a judicial finding of conspiracy exempts co-conspirator statements from the 
hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
 220. See Katyal, supra note 161, at 1326–27 (“In general, those insulated will be leaders, who 
orchestrate actions to maintain plausible deniability. . . . Conspiracy liability partially 
compensates for diffusion by punishing those who hide behind the veneer of the group.”). 
 221. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 222. See supra Parts II−III. 
 223. Goldstein, supra note 187, at 406. 
 224. Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 213, at 920. 
 225. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 16 (1994) (holding that a particular statute 
did not require proof of an overt act, even though it is typically an element of many conspiracy 
statutes).  
 226. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975). 
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the agreement.227 Conspiracy has a double mens rea as well: in 
addition to the state of mind required for each actus reus, the 
defendant must have the specific intent that the object of the 
conspiracy be effected.228 
Criminal agreement is thought to be the primary danger of 
conspiracy, and the true actus reus of the offense.229 Agreement in 
conspiracy may be proven by either direct or circumstantial 
evidence.230 In a typical conspiracy case, law enforcement finds no 
written memorialization or other direct evidence of agreement.231 
Instead, agreement often must be inferred from the actions of the 
defendants.232 Judges routinely prepare jury instructions to the effect 
that “conspirators do not go out upon the public highways and 
proclaim their purpose; their methods are devious, hidden, secret and 
clandestine.”233 
Overt acts require still less in the way of proof. Unlike 
agreement, the overt-act requirement is a vaguely defined concept 
that does not quite rise to the level of an actus reus.234 In fact, some 
federal conspiracy statutes do not even require an overt act at all.235 
The Supreme Court has upheld these statutes on the grounds that 
neither the common-law backdrop to conspiracy law nor the ordinary 
principles of statutory construction require reading an overt-act 
 
 227. The overt-act requirement varies—some federal statutes do not require proof of an 
overt act as an element of conspiracy, but many do. See Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 
214 (2005) (explaining that some, but not all, federal statutes have an overt-act requirement). 
 228. See United States v. Rodriguez-Velez, 597 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2010) (“To establish a 
defendant’s willing participation, the government must show ‘two kinds of intent: intent to agree 
and intent to commit the substantive offense.’” (quoting United States v. Bristol-Mártir, 570 
F.3d 29, 39 (1st Cir. 2009))).  
 229. See Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 777 (“Conspiracy is an inchoate offense, the essence of which is 
an agreement to commit an unlawful act.”). 
 230. See United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986) (“While the government 
must establish the elements of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, this can be done entirely 
through circumstantial evidence.”).  
 231. See Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 213, at 933 
(“Conspiracy is by nature a clandestine offense. It is improbable that the parties will enter into 
their illegal agreement openly.”). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Goldstein, supra note 187, at 411 n.15 (citation omitted). 
 234. Indeed, some have argued that the overt-act requirement cannot be properly described 
as an element at all, but as a mere procedural requirement. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 
347, 388 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The cases in this court have agreed that the statute has 
not made the overt act a part of the crime, which still remains the conspiracy alone.”). 
 235. See Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 214 (2005) (explaining that some, but not 
all, federal statutes have an overt-act requirement). 
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requirement into a statute that does not explicitly contain one.236 
Rather, the Court said in Shabani that agreement alone is sufficient 
actus reus to pass constitutional muster.237 
The origins and rationale of the overt-act requirement are 
somewhat murky.238 It may have originated as a kind of descriptive 
formalization of the “legislative interpretation of what was necessary 
to prove a conspiracy at common law,” since agreement is usually 
proven by circumstantial evidence.239 Others posit that the overt-act 
requirement serves merely as a formal procedural requirement.240 
Most popular and convincing, however, is the argument that the overt 
act serves to “manifest that the conspiracy is at work,” and is not just 
“a project still resting solely in the minds of the conspirators.”241 In 
this view, the overt act serves to buttress the actus reus’s role in 
ensuring that bad thought is punished only when it poses an actual 
threat to society. Or, to reframe the analysis slightly, the overt act 
helps safeguard “mere talk” from being wrongly understood to signify 
specific intent to achieve an unlawful goal.242 
Under current law, almost any act, no matter how small, may 
fulfill the overt-act requirement.243 It may be minor to the point of 
triviality,244 and need not even be “reasonably calculated to effect the 
 
 236. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15 (1994) (declining to read an overt-act 
requirement into a statute that did not explicitly state one). 
 237. Id. at 15–16. 
 238. See Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 213, at 946 (“The 
inclusion of the overt-act requirement in the federal general conspiracy statute was 
unaccompanied by any indication of the function it was to serve.”). 
 239. Id. at 946–47. 
 240. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is no 
more a part of the crime . . . than is the fact that the statute of limitations has not run.”). 
Additionally, in some jurisdictions the overt act serves to establish venue. See United States v. 
Naranjo, 14 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 1994) (“In a prosecution for conspiracy, venue is proper in 
any district in which ‘an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the 
coconspirators.’” (quoting United States v. Ramirez-Amaya, 812 F.2d 813, 826 (2d Cir. 1987))). 
 241. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957) (quoting Carlson v. United States, 187 
F.2d 366, 370 (10th Cir. 1951) (quotation marks omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Burks 
v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). 
 242. See United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140, 169 (E.D.N.Y 1997), aff’d, 166 F.3d 75 
(2d Cir. 1999) (“As an added protection to defendants against punishment for mere talk, in 
some instances an overt act must take place in furtherance of the conspiracy.”). 
 243. See, e.g., Yates, 354 U.S. at 334 (holding that attending an otherwise lawful meeting 
constituted an overt act). 
 244. See id. 
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specific object of the conspiracy.”245 That an act was undertaken in 
furtherance of a conspiracy may be inferred from the existence of the 
agreement.246 Thus, even an innocent and lawful act, when infected 
with criminal agreement, can serve as the overt act that may create 
criminal liability—even calling someone on the telephone247 or driving 
to another city248 can be enough. The overt act need not even be the 
defendant’s, but can be carried out by any of the alleged conspirators, 
including those not named in the indictment.249 
Giving the prosecutor such wide latitude to prove conspiracy 
weakens the actus reus requirement; when agreement can be proven 
by circumstantial evidence, and an overt act can be almost any 
minimally corroborative, innocuous event, the “double” actus reus 
requirement starts to look more like a half measure. As Professor 
Steven Morrison rather sarcastically explains it, “[W]e know that 
defendants agreed to rob a bank because they bought ski masks. 
Buying ski masks constitutes an overt act because the defendants 
agreed to rob the bank.”250 This kind of bootstrapping effectively 
lowers the standard of proof for the agreement to something less than 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and allows the jury to convict on only the 
barest implication that a crime has occurred.251 
The weak actus reus requirement of conspiracy law has given rise 
to a series of cases in which juries have convicted defendants on the 
 
 245. See Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 213, at 947 (describing 
a court’s decision that a statutory offense for conspiracy only required an agreement, and that 
“the overt act merely afford[ed] a ‘locus poenitentiae’ so that before the commission of the act a 
conspirator might withdraw from the scheme without incurring guilt”). 
 246. See United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986) (“While the government 
must establish the elements of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, this can be done entirely 
through circumstantial evidence.”); see also United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 134 (3d Cir. 
2005) (“[T]he very nature of the crime of conspiracy is such that it often may be established only 
by indirect and circumstantial evidence.”). 
 247. See Bartoli v. United States, 192 F.2d 130, 132 (4th Cir. 1951) (“In our opinion, the 
telephone conversations . . . were all overt acts.”). 
 248. See United States v. Shearer, 794 F.2d 1545, 1550–51 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the 
transportation of smuggled electronics through the Middle District of Florida was a sufficient 
overt act performed in furtherance of a conspiracy to create venue in the district). 
 249. United States v. Angotti, 105 F.3d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 250. Morrison, supra note 141, at 896–97. 
 251. Goldstein, supra note 187, at 411–12 (“The net effect . . . is to free juries from the 
automatic compliance with ‘law’ which instructions ordinar[i]ly demand and to invite a ‘guilty’ 
verdict on less evidence than might otherwise be required.”); Developments in the Law—
Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 213, at 947 (arguing that “in their zeal to emphasize that the 
agreement need not be proved directly, the courts sometimes neglect to say that it need be 
proved at all”). 
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basis of evidence so insufficient as to breach the constitutional 
requirement that crimes be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.252 The 
most notorious of these cases involve large, multi-defendant 
conspiracy trials. In these group-liability cases, defendants who have 
some association with conspirators, but who are not themselves part 
of any conspiracy, are likely to be “swept into the conspiratorial 
net.”253 Because “[t]here generally will be evidence of wrongdoing by 
somebody,”254 and because the jury is expressly permitted to make 
inferences from circumstantial evidence, even a defendant who did no 
more than ride in a conspirator’s car can be convicted for a criminal 
plot he never intended to join.255 Conspiracy’s weak actus reus 
requirement often poses a temptation too great to resist for the 
average jury to find a defendant guilty by his association with 
conspirators.256 
B. The Fantasy Defense 
Conspiracy law poses two main problems for those claiming a 
fantasy defense. First, conspiracy’s de facto relaxed standard of proof 
poses the risk of convicting defendants on the basis of insufficient 
evidence, a due-process violation. Second, because the charged 
agreement involved in a fantasy-defense case is likely to be highly 
inflammatory, the jury may convict a defendant on the basis of the 
 
 252. See Marcus, supra note 215, at 19 n.98 (“[I]t is not clear whether the courts mean to 
suggest that jurors can be instructed on anything other than the reasonable doubt standard for 
individual defendants (clearly they cannot be) or whether somehow the government is relieved 
of its burden to show proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Professor Paul Marcus conducted an 
empirical study of conspiracy law in 1977 by interviewing over one hundred judges and lawyers 
and distributing questionnaires to many others. Id. at 2. In 1992, he followed up with written 
communications to those judges and lawyers to see how conspiracy prosecutions had changed. 
Id. He found that the survey respondents observed growing sensitivity to issues of insufficient 
proof in conspiracy prosecutions, and one lawyer noted that “[these] courts have reversed 
several conspiracy convictions . . . where, though the evidence may have aroused substantial 
suspicion concerning the defendant, it failed to establish more than association and presence.” 
Id. at 19–20 (alteration in original). 
 253. Id. at 18–19. 
 254. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
 255. See United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 513, 519 (11th Cir. 1990) (overturning the 
defendant’s conviction in a drug conspiracy because the only evidence linking him to the 
conspiracy was a ride he took in a conspirator’s car and his presence at a drug transaction, which 
was insufficient proof to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 256. See Marcus, supra note 215, at 19–20 (discussing instances of courts reversing 
conspiracy convictions where the evidence established only that individual defendants were 
associated with the conspirators). 
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thought-content of her expression, whether or not it believes she truly 
intended to achieve an unlawful goal. This second problem is both a 
due-process violation—because of its probability of leading to 
wrongful convictions based on fantasy instead of real conspiracy—
and a First Amendment violation—because a wrongful conviction 
also infringes the defendant’s right to expression. 
The fantasy defense is too new a development to have 
engendered substantial scholarship or appellate opinions the way 
large, multi-defendant conspiracy cases have, making it difficult to 
evaluate the impact of conspiracy law on fantasy defendants.257 
However, by comparing the characteristics of the large group-liability 
cases that lead to wrongful convictions to characteristics of fantasy-
defense cases, it becomes clear that the fantasy-defense cases pose an 
even greater risk of wrongful convictions. 
First, as in the group-liability context, conspiracy cases involving 
the fantasy defense pose a due-process risk of convicting an innocent 
defendant on insufficient evidence as a result of the weak actus reus 
requirement. Arguably, the fantasy defense poses a greater risk of 
conviction on the basis of insufficient evidence. In group-liability 
cases, the risk of convicting an innocent defendant stems from the 
possibility of the jury giving too much weight to circumstantial 
evidence of an agreement.258 For example, a jury might impermissibly 
conclude that a defendant has agreed to take part in a conspiracy 
because he was near the crime scene and knew the conspirators.259 In 
fantasy-defense cases, in contrast, the jury is presented with what the 
prosecution claims is direct evidence of agreement. In Valle’s case, for 
instance, the government’s case relied on the proposition that Valle’s 
chats represented actual agreement, rather than fantasy expression.260 
Thus, the due-process risk in these cases is the possibility that a jury 
will misinterpret expressions of fantasy as expressions of 
conspiratorial agreement on the basis of constitutionally insufficient 
evidence. Arguably, this problem is more subtle and difficult to 
 
 257. One exception is a paper discussing the fantasy defense in the context of the Patrick J. 
Naughton case. See Yamagami, supra note 77, at 547. The Naughton case is discussed in Part 
II.D.  
 258. See Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 213, at 947 (discussing 
strategies used by prosecutors to circumvent the overt-act requirement in conspiracy cases). 
 259. See, e.g., Hernandez, 896 F.2d at 519 (where the only evidence linking the defendant to 
the conspiracy was the fact that he rode in a conspirator’s car and was present at a drug 
transaction).  
 260. See supra Part I. 
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understand than the problem posed in the group-liability context. As 
a result, it seems even more likely that a jury will convict a defendant 
in a fantasy-defense case on the basis of insufficient evidence of an 
unlawful agreement. 
Second, fantasy-defense cases pose an additional risk that group-
liability cases do not. Although defendants in both categories suffer 
the risk of a conviction based on insufficient evidence—albeit in 
slightly different ways—the fantasy-defense cases additionally raise 
the concern that a defendant will be convicted for the thought-
content of his expression, rather than for his conduct.261 As discussed 
previously, the actus reus requirement functions as criminal law’s 
primary protection against both the risk that a defendant will be 
punished for the bad thought-content of his expression, as well as the 
risk that a jury will punish a defendant’s thoughts in the mistaken 
belief that they will necessarily lead to action.262 Because fantasy-
defense cases, like Valle’s, are likely to demonstrate that the 
defendant has expressed inflammatory and taboo thoughts, a jury 
may convict on the basis of disgust or fear rather than on its actual 
belief that a defendant intended his expression as conspiracy 
agreement. If conspiracy law’s weak actus reus requirement fails to 
protect against even the comparatively simple problem posed by 
group-liability cases, it hardly seems plausible that it can protect 
against the complex and inflammatory issues that arise in fantasy-
defense cases. 
Therefore, like the defendant convicted because of his trivial 
association with a conspirator,263 the defendant charged with 
conspiracy on the basis of his fantasy role-play is likely to be 
convicted on the basis of evidence insufficient to prove his unlawful 
agreement. However, the fantasy role-player runs an even greater 
risk of unfair conviction than the group-liability defendant because 
the jury may punish him for his bad expression, a constitutionally 
unacceptable result. 
V.  LINE-DRAWING AND THE FANTASY DEFENSE 
Although the Constitution and core tenets of criminal law 
instruct that Gilberto Valle has a right not to be punished for his 
 
 261. See supra Part II. 
 262. See supra Part III. 
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 253–56. 
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fantasy expression,264 the relaxed actus reus requirement of conspiracy 
law, combined with the inflammatory nature of his speech, posed the 
risk that the jury would do just that.265 This tension suggests that 
additional safeguards are necessary to ensure that those charged with 
conspiracy are not unfairly convicted on the basis of the socially 
unacceptable thought-content of their expression. First, this Part uses 
Valle’s case to demonstrate why conspiracy law must be reformed to 
protect those who invoke a fantasy defense from due-process and 
First Amendment violations. Second, this Part explores some possible 
safeguards, and proposes that the best option is overruling Shabani 
and strengthening the overt-act requirement. 
A. Valle’s Acquittal: A Case Study in the Need for Safeguards in 
Conspiracy Cases 
Gilberto Valle’s trial starkly demonstrated both the due-process 
and First Amendment risks a conspiracy prosecution poses to those 
who claim a fantasy defense. First, the prosecution offered 
insufficient evidence that Valle had actually entered into an 
agreement to commit an unlawful act. Second, the inflammatory 
nature of Valle’s expression rendered it likely that the jury would be 
disgusted by or afraid of him, and would therefore be more willing to 
convict. 
To begin with, the prosecution introduced direct evidence of 
agreement in the form of Valle’s chats, but offered little in the way of 
extrinsic evidence from which the jurors could infer the meaning 
behind the text—that is, whether the chats were fantasy or 
agreement.266 Rather, Valle’s alleged overt acts—including visiting 
one woman for brunch with his wife and child in tow, giving PBA 
cards to various acquaintances, and texting friends—were just as 
likely to be innocuous social gestures as they were to bear any actual 
relation to a kidnapping conspiracy.267 In other words, the purported 
overt acts, while meeting the current legal standard to fulfill that 
requirement, did not perform their function of bolstering the actus 
reus requirement to ensure that Valle’s expression actually signified 
his intent to kidnap anyone. 
 
 264. See supra Parts II−III. 
 265. See supra Part IV. 
 266. See supra text accompanying notes 53–58. 
 267. See id. 
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Furthermore, the emotional incentive for the jury to convict was 
great. They were presented with the possibility of a truly horrific 
criminal plot, and tasked with determining whether it was real or 
fantasy without much substantial evidence to indicate which to 
choose.268 They were invited to make this determination on the basis 
of any and all of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution offered, 
including not only the content of the chats alleged to represent 
agreement, but also the contents of chats that concededly represented 
fantasies.269 Furthermore, they were to make this determination using 
their own “common sense,” without the benefit of any expert 
testimony explaining the relationship between fantasy and action.270 A 
reasonable person could very well become convinced that a man like 
Gilberto Valle, guilty of the charged crime or not, was too dangerous 
or too distasteful to live among the population at large. 
Of course the government could (and in Valle’s case did) argue 
that it is the special province of the jury to sift through the evidence, 
contested though it may be, and determine a defendant’s true 
intentions.271 After all, the courts have said that giving deference to a 
jury’s verdict is “especially important when reviewing a conviction for 
conspiracy” because of the jury’s role in applying their understanding 
of human behavior to draw inferences about whether a conspiracy 
exists.272 The jury has never been treated as infallible, however.273 In 
fact, our entire body of evidentiary rules exists to mitigate the risk 
that a jury will convict or acquit a defendant based on the wrong kind 
of information or reasoning.274 Courts have proven especially willing 
to control jury decisionmaking when First Amendment rights are at 
stake.275 And although examples are rare, courts will sometimes 
overturn a jury verdict on the basis of insufficient evidence.276 
 
 268. See id. 
 269. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
 270. See Transcript of Record at 1582, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 7, 2013) (referring to the “limits of fantasy under common sense”). 
 271. Response of the United States of America in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motions 
for a New Trial and Judgment of Acquittal at 6, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013) (“Thus, the task of choosing among the permissible competing 
inferences that can be drawn from the evidence is for the jury, not for the reviewing court.”). 
 272. See United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1120–21 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 273. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 215, at 13 (discussing the actions of trial judges to break up 
large conspiracy cases to make the jury’s task of determining individual guilt easier). 
 274. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 1 (2d ed. 2008).  
 275. See supra Part II.C. 
 276. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. 
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Of course, Judge Gardephe did just that, holding that the jury 
convicted Valle on the basis of insufficient evidence.277 For a judge to 
overturn a jury verdict, it must be the case that even when all the 
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government, no 
reasonable jury could convict the defendant.278 The risk inherent in 
having a jury decide fantasy-defense cases under current conspiracy 
law should be evident to any observer; it seems highly plausible that 
the jury convicted Valle based not on his actions, but on his fantasies, 
either because his fantasies were horrific, or because—due to 
conspiracy law’s de facto relaxed burden of proof—the jury 
misinterpreted his expression of fantasy as an actual agreement to 
kidnap and eat other human beings. The fact that Judge Gardephe 
resorted to the rare remedy of overturning a jury verdict further 
demonstrates the singular risk of unconstitutional convictions in 
fantasy-defense cases. 
If it can be shown that a jury is likely to convict a defendant on 
anything less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, some safeguard 
is not only justified, but required to prevent a violation of a 
defendant’s constitutional rights.279 Establishing reasonable 
safeguards is particularly important because though Valle’s case is 
truly bizarre, the fantasy defense seems unlikely to stop with him. As 
law enforcement becomes increasingly Internet-savvy, we are likely to 
continue to see defendants like Valle arrested for their chats and 
forum participation.280 
Of course, for every defendant like Valle, who can make a strong 
case that his chats were mere expressions of fantasy, there is another 
Internet user who really does pose a threat to society.281 For example, 
a Boston-area man recently pled guilty to solicitation to commit a 
crime of violence after he described online his plan to kidnap and kill 
children.282 These chats led police to discover that he possessed a 
soundproofed basement, torture devices, bleach, and a child-size 
 
 277. United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 278. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. 
 279. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a criminal defendant). 
 280. See Kelly, supra note 195 (discussing law enforcement’s increasing use of social media 
as a crime-fighting tool). 
 281. Morgan Winsor, Man Who Plotted To Kill and Eat Children Gets More than 26 Years in 
Prison, CNN (Sept. 17, 2013, 11:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/17/us/cannibal-eat-
children-case/index.html. 
 282. Id. 
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coffin, along with other supplies he had acquired in preparation for 
his plans.283 Accordingly, this Note does not propose that law 
enforcement should refrain from investigating those who engage in 
suspicious online conversations. Rather, what the law needs is a more 
robust way of distinguishing between the fantasy role-players and the 
real criminal conspirators. 
B. Potential Modes of Safeguarding the Right to Fantasy 
But even if the fantasy defense presents special due-process and 
First Amendment problems, what safeguards are appropriate to 
ensure that fantasy defendants are not wrongfully convicted on the 
basis of their “bad” expression? Although the fantasy defense is too 
novel for scholars to have addressed it directly at length, examining 
First Amendment protections proposed or enacted in other contexts 
may shed light on the question. This Part appraises some of those 
protections, before suggesting that the best alternative is for the 
Court to overrule Shabani and strengthen the overt-act requirement. 
1. Proposed Options.  Two broad categories of doctrinal 
safeguards seem possible in the context of the fantasy defense: 
changing substantive First Amendment law and changing the 
evidentiary requirements of conspiracy law. Though the first method 
is perhaps the more traditional approach courts and scholars have 
taken with respect to protecting freedom of expression, the latter 
method is likely to be more effective in the context of speech that 
doubles as criminal conduct. 
Often when the free exchange of ideas and personal autonomy 
are threatened by a restriction on speech, courts respond by 
expanding the definition of First Amendment expression to cover the 
area of threatened speech. For example, when the Supreme Court 
decided Miller, it limited the scope of the obscenity exception by 
redefining obscenity to exclude all but those works that “appeal to 
the prurient interest in sex” and have no “serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.”284 
However, this kind of definitional change to the scope of First 
Amendment protections seems unlikely to be workable in the area of 
conspiracy law, because First Amendment implications for speech as 
crime are different in kind from First Amendment implications for 
 
 283. Id. 
 284. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
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other kinds of expression like obscenity. An obscenity conviction 
based on materials that are protected by the First Amendment 
violates the defendant’s rights whether he in fact possesses the 
charged material or not. In other words, all that matters to him is the 
legal definition of obscenity. However, for speech that doubles as 
crime, the conviction violates the defendant’s First Amendment rights 
only when the defendant is innocent of the charge. The determining 
factor is not the legal, but the factual status of the purported 
agreement. No plausible way of changing the legal definition of 
“agreement” would be able to capture real, but not fake, criminal 
agreements. 
This problem with changing the scope of First Amendment 
protections by redefining the limits of protected speech suggests that 
the appropriate First Amendment prophylactic rule in conspiracy 
cases is an evidentiary one. The Supreme Court and lower courts 
have already demonstrated some willingness to use evidentiary rules 
to protect against the possibility of a defendant being wrongly 
convicted for the thought-content of his expression. For example, 
recall the First Circuit’s decision in Spock, in which the court outlined 
special requirements for proving specific intent in cases where the 
purported conspiratorial expression consisted of both protected 
speech and potential agreements to participate in a criminal 
conspiracy.285 Furthermore, an evidentiary safeguard could protect not 
only against the First Amendment risk of a defendant being convicted 
for the thought-content of his expression, but also against the due-
process risk of a defendant being convicted on the basis of insufficient 
evidence. 
2. The Overt-Act Requirement.  Perhaps the most obvious 
evidentiary method of safeguarding the right to fantasy is 
strengthening conspiracy law’s overt-act requirement. In fact, the 
most plausible justification for maintaining an overt-act requirement 
at all is to ensure that the conspiracy is indeed “at work,” and that the 
alleged conspirators actually intended to achieve an unlawful goal.286 
Despite this function, courts have given short shrift to the overt-
act requirement over the years. Although many federal conspiracy 
statutes require an overt act, the Supreme Court held in Shabani that 
an overt-act element is not constitutionally required in a conspiracy 
 
 285. See supra text accompanying notes 172–76. 
 286. See supra text accompanying notes 241–42. 
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statute because the agreement itself is the true actus reus of 
conspiracy offenses.287 
However, as one commentator points out, the Shabani Court 
erred in considering the necessity of the overt act only as a formal 
actus reus requirement.288 The Court neglected to factor in another 
constitutionally relevant function of the overt act: ensuring that 
agreement be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.289 The article cites 
this as the reason the Court should overrule Shabani, arguing that 
without an overt act, no conspiracy can be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.290 Professor Martin Redish further argues that the 
overt act is required to safeguard First Amendment rights in 
conspiracy prosecutions.291 He contends that the First Amendment 
requires a non-expressive overt act that “effectively transform[s] the 
communication into nothing more than an element of the non-
expressive behavior.”292 
However, as previously discussed, even when an overt-act 
requirement is instituted, current conspiracy law treats it more like a 
formality than a true element, robbing it of its usefulness.293 An overt 
act can be any trivial or innocent act that is minimally consistent in 
some way with the alleged conspiracy.294 For example, in Gilberto 
Valle’s case, the alleged overt acts included giving out PBA cards, 
searching for “targets” in the police database, and arranging social 
meetings with women.295 These acts, by the letter of the law, are 
sufficient to meet the overt-act requirement. However, it seems 
obvious that these acts have little, if any, probative value when it 
comes to determining Valle’s true intentions. As the defense pointed 
 
 287. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15–16 (1994). 
 288. See Kevin Jon Heller, Note, Whatever Happened to Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? 
Of Drug Conspiracies, Overt Acts, and United States v. Shabani, 49 STAN. L. REV. 111, 113 
(1996) (equating the overt-act requirement in conspiracy with the Fifth Amendment 
reasonable-doubt standard). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 142. 
 291. Martin H. Redish & Michael J.T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy as Free Expression, 76 
ALB. L. REV. 697, 732 (2013). 
 292. Id. 
 293. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is no 
more a part of the crime . . . than is the fact that the statute of limitations has not run.”). 
 294. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 6 (1945) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 259 
F. 685, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1919)). 
 295. Transcript of Record at 1528–30, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 7, 2013). 
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out, and as the court noted in overturning Valle’s conviction, those 
acts are just as consistent with a theory of innocence as they are with 
a theory of guilt. 
As a result, this Note goes further than those commentators, and 
argues that not only is an overt act required to avoid constitutional 
violations, but also the overt act must be more substantial than the 
kind the law currently considers acceptable. As Professor George 
Fletcher points out, this would be a “sensible restrictive measure” 
that would prevent the government from using conspiracy to target 
unpopular speech and thought.296 However, little, if any, scholarship 
or case law seems to have explicitly proposed this solution. 
A redefinition of the overt-act requirement could be formulated 
a number of ways to balance the constitutional need for the overt act 
to be more significant with the government’s interest in effective 
prosecution and enforcement. Any redefinition should, however, 
include the requirement that an overt act must independently make it 
more likely that the defendant actually intended an unlawful goal; an 
overt act should not be equally consistent with guilt or innocence. 
In designing this definition, one could follow the lead of the First 
Circuit in Spock, which suggested that when a defendant participates 
in a group that engages in both protected political expression and 
illegal conspiratorial agreement, specific intent must be proven in one 
of several particular ways. One way the court allowed the government 
to prove specific intent was by an “individual defendant’s subsequent 
legal act if that act is ‘clearly undertaken for the specific purpose of 
rendering effective the later illegal activity which is advocated.’”297 
Another possibility is found in the commentary to a proposed 
revision to the federal criminal code, which states, “[T]he overt act 
must be such that it manifests a purpose to effect an objective of the 
agreement.”298 
These modest definitional changes assign the overt-act 
requirement some weight to carry, but pose little risk of preventing 
the government from prosecuting a legitimate conspiracy. In Gilberto 
Valle’s case, a more robust overt-act requirement could have 
precluded the jury’s constitutionally insufficient guilty verdict. As the 
court noted in overturning the verdict, “[I]n determining whether the 
 
 296. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.6, at 225 (2000). 
 297. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 173 (1st Cir. 1969) (quoting Scales v. United 
States, 367 U.S. 203, 234 (1961)). 
 298. S. REP. 95-605, at 163 (1977). 
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Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt Valle’s criminal 
intent—his specific intent to actually kidnap a woman—the fact that 
no kidnappings took place and that no real-world, concrete steps 
toward committing a kidnapping were ever taken, is significant.”299 
Consequently, if the jury understood conspiracy to require a more 
robust overt act like the formulations proposed above, it seems 
unlikely that it would have wrongfully convicted Valle. 
CONCLUSION 
Even a defendant with the most utterly repulsive fantasies 
imaginable should not be convicted based on anything less than the 
jury’s belief beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the acts 
charged. The First Amendment and criminal law’s actus reus 
requirement demand that conspiracy law give effect to this standard 
to avoid impinging on a defendant’s constitutional right to express his 
fantasies and thoughts. Although the current Supreme Court seems 
indisposed to tighten the requirements to prove conspiracy, one way 
to attain this goal is for courts to return to a meaningful definition of 
conspiracy’s overt-act requirement. Bolstering the overt-act 
requirement will ensure that juries are better equipped to come to the 
correct verdict in cases like Gilberto Valle’s, eliminating the need for 
judges to engage in post hoc mitigation. 
 
 
 299. United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (emphasis added). 
